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Foreword 
David A. Leavens * 
davidl@sussex.ac.uk 
As this foreword is written, at the dawn of the 21st Century, the cognitive 
sciences are in epistemological ferment. The exuberant optimism of the late 
20th-Century adaptationist programme has, itself, started to fragment like the 
many fingers of a wave against the implacable shore of empirical reality. 
Dramatic new directions in the philosophy of mind (enactivism, embodied 
cognition, distributed cognition) and in developmental psychology (dynamic 
systems theory) are beginning to mature. This special issue, Pointing: Where 
Embodied Cognition meets the Symbolic Mind, edited by Massimiliano 
Cappuccio, brings together in one volume an incendiary mix of the emerging 
generation of philosophers and language researchers, who bring their diverse 
perspectives to moor on one of the most fascinating phenomena in human 
development: the ability to co-orient in both space and time to a common focus 
with what seems, on the face of it, to be a simple pointing gesture. The 
emerging significance of research and analysis pertaining to pointing reflects a 
recent phase shift in the sciences concerned with mind and behaviour. To put 
these innovations in context, it might be worthwhile to review the sweeping 
upheavals that have recently occurred in the conceptual bedrocks of 
psychology and the philosophy of language. 
 
The fact that all normal children acquire essentially comparable 
grammars of great complexity with remarkable rapidity suggests that 
human beings are somehow specially designed to do this, with data-
handling or ‘hypothesis-formulating’ ability of unknown character and 
complexity (Chomsky, 1959, p. 57). 
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In 1959, Noam Chomsky fired a salvo of criticisms against the extreme 
environmentalist dogma that pervaded the behavioural sciences at that time. 
One of the pillars of his argument was that there was insufficient regularity in 
the environments of developing children to account for the regularities in their 
ensuing speech. This is the argument later known as the poverty of the 
stimulus: the idea that there must be innate, universal human perceptual, even 
conceptual, mental processes that support our species-unique communicative 
behaviour. This notion, that the environments of developing children are too 
irregular to support the regularities manifest in the acquisition of speech, is 
one of the most influential ideas of the 20th Century, and it currently 
permeates theoretical development in the cognitive sciences and its 
philosophical foundations (see, e.g., Leudar & Costall, 2004). 
But a battle is not won until your opponents concede the field. Historically, 
with respect to the core question of whether there could, in principle, be such a 
thing as an innate cognitive predisposition or a species-specific learning 
mechanism, this happened very quickly after Chomsky's (1959) critique of 
Skinner's Verbal Behavior (1957). The behaviourist doctrine of strong 
environmentalism fell after empirical observations by well-trained 
behaviourists (including Skinner's former students) of animals' species-
specific behavioural traits that were impossible to extinguish (e.g., Bolles, 
1970; Breland & Breland, 1961). For example, the Brelands, a husband-and-
wife team of professional animal trainers, concluded that 
 
[a]fter 14 years of continuous conditioning and observation of 
thousands of animals, it is our reluctant conclusion that the behavior of 
any species cannot be adequately understood, predicted, or controlled 
without knowledge of its instinctive patterns, evolutionary history, and 
ecological niche (Breland & Breland, 1961, p. 684). 
 
Similarly, Bolles (e.g., 1970) demonstrated that rats displayed innate 
responses to aversive stimuli, arguing persuasively that animals in the wild did 
not have time to acquire escape responses through trial-and-error learning, 
because a single error in escaping a predator would be potentially fatal. Thus, 
these and other observations, by well-trained behaviourists (e.g., Garcia et al., 
1955), conceded that, contrary to established theory (a) species did display 
innate patterns of learning and (b) that the learning environments of 
developing organisms were not the sole influence on these response patterns. 
 Foreword V 
This opened the way to the modern adaptationist programme, in which two 
generations of cognitive scientists have laboured to identify the human species-
specific cognitive adaptations that support our uniquely symbolic way of life. 
By 20 years ago, the popular science literature was communicating to lay 
audiences the fruits of the first generation of research under the adaptationist 
programme (e.g., Barkow et al., 1992; Bickerton, 1992; Corballis, 1992; 
Pinker, 1994). The field had arrived at a new dogma: humans had species-
specific adaptations for representing others' minds, and representing those 
minds in language.  
Under the auspices of these emerging nativist perspectives on human 
cognition and communication, pointing was viewed as one of these human 
species-specific adaptations. For example, Degos (2001) wrote that "[t]he 
pointing gesture is exclusively human, and universal within mankind" (p. 263) 
and Butterworth (2003) argued that ". . . human index-finger pointing is 
biologically based and species-specific" (p. 28). Similar views have been 
espoused by many leading researchers on gestural communication (e.g., 
Povinelli, Bering, & Giambrone, 2003; Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 
2007). This simple perspective on pointing as a human species-specific 
gesture was severely challenged by experimental elicitations of pointing by 
animals: specifically, the great apes (e.g., Call and Tomasello, 1994; Leavens, 
Hopkins, & Bard, 1996). It is now empirically well-established that great apes, 
without any special training, either adopt or invent pointing gestures in captive 
circumstances (reviewed by Leavens & Bard, 2011), and pointing has recently 
been reported in such diverse species as monkeys (e.g., Kumashiro, Ishibashi, 
Itakura, & Iriki, 2002; Meunier, Prieur, & Vauclair, 2013, Mitchell & 
Anderson, 1997; Hess, Novak, & Povinelli, 1993), dolphins (Xitco, Gory, & 
Kuczaq, 2001, 2004), and even birds (Kaplan, 2011). Given the spontaneous 
emergence of pointing in animals, it is clear that pointing is not simply a human 
species-specific gesture, and this fact has fanned significant theoretical 
diversity in its interpretation in recent years. 
That pointing is not so simple can be readily discerned from a brief review 
of recent psychological and philosophical compendia on the subject. In 1995, 
Chris Moore and Philip Dunham published a collection of papers (Joint 
Attention: Its Origins and Role in Development) by virtually all of the leading 
developmental psychologists concerned with how human babies learn to follow 
their caregivers' gaze and pointing to visually fixate on a common focus, a state 
of intersubjective engagement known as "joint attention." The theoretical 
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significance of that landmark volume lay, in part, in the uneasy concatenations 
of papers by scientists with careers built on deep commitments to ontological 
presuppositions that were mutually contradictory from one chapter to the next. 
The book was a kaleidoscope of chapters grounded in theoretical commitments 
to nativist, representationalist, and environmentalist core assumptions and, as 
such, it fairly represented the diversity of mutually inconsistent worldviews on 
one of the earliest developing social capacities in our species. Thus, as recently 
as the mid-1990s there was a decided lack of unanimity on the nature of the 
processes that shaped human beings to jointly attend to common focus of 
attention. 
Sotaro Kita (2003) later published a volume entitled: Pointing: Where 
Language, Culture, and Cognition Meet. Like the present special issue of 
Humana.Mente, this book was focused on pointing, one of the praxic 
foundations of the development and manifestation of joint attention in many 
cultures, worldwide. Unlike the Moore and Dunham (1995) volume, which 
was primarily concerned with the development of joint attention abilities, 
Kita's seminal book was catholic in its attention to the use of manual deixis 
across human cultures, and across the entirety of the lifespan. Contained 
within these pages was a profusion of disciplinary approaches to pointing, 
including developmental psychology, semiotics, psycholinguistics, 
comparative psychology, cross-cultural psychology, and anthropology, 
representing less an interdisciplinary synthesis than a cross-disciplinary 
collision of fundamentally different--yet pluralistically fruitful--points of view 
on the remarkable ability of humans to share both perceptual and conceptual 
entities. Reviewing the book, I commented that: 
 
[f]ar from being the last word on pointing, this volume highlights both 
how little we really know about pointing and how extraordinarily many 
different kinds of research programmes can profitably study it (Leavens, 
2004, p. 157).  
 
This area of empirical inquiry is so rich, that every single chapter in that book 
will, I believe, form the basis of a productive research programme as the 
behavioural and language sciences mature. 
Thus, the study of pointing is a productive and emerging area of empirical 
inquiry. Until recently, however, there has been no corresponding humanistic 
reflection of the state of the art in philosophical approaches to pointing. In 
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2005 developmental psychologists and philosophers contributed to an edited 
volume by Eilan, Hoerl, McCormack, & Roessler, Joint Attention: 
Communication and Other Minds, in which several impressive papers 
attempted to integrate emotional and cognitive development, followed by a 
series of philosophical papers concerned, in part, with the significance of joint 
attention for the creation of knowledge that is, somehow, shared among 
individuals. Late last year, Axel Seemann edited a unique volume on joint 
attention (Joint Attention: New Developments in Psychology, Philosophy of 
Mind, and Social Neuroscience, 2012) that also presented contributions from 
both empirical scientists and philosophers. This heady mix of science and 
humanism, yet again, reflects the sheer conceptual promiscuity of pointing--
appealing to almost any social scientist or philosopher. As Watzl recently 
noted in his review of this book: "[t]he collection displays the liveliness of this 
research area. . . . and much research, both empirical as well as conceptual, 
remains to be done" (2012, para. 36; another review of this book appears in 
the present special issue, in the contribution by Dow).  
That conceptual and empirical work continues right here, right now, in this 
special issue. This is the first time, to my knowledge, that philosophers have 
outnumbered empirical scientists in one collection concerned with pointing. 
This is an intoxicating blend of sophisticated conceptual analyses informed by 
the very leading edges of theoretical advances in related disciplines, such as 
evolutionary theory and the cognitive sciences. Whether the readers' 
commitments lean towards representationalist or embodied approaches to 
manual deixis, there are papers here that will both resonate with and challenge 
those leanings. The diverse papers, here, are stunningly integrative, and 
conceptually sophisticated. In terms of the contributions that intersect with my 
own research expertise, in comparative and developmental psychology--
Gonthier's systematic application of her applied evolutionary epistemology to 
the relationship between pointing and language, Moore's detailed analysis of 
the extracranial buttressing that pointing, in contrast to many other signals, 
requires, and Sultanescu and Andrews's deft development of normativity and 
its application to nonhuman signals--I have been stimulated and provoked, in 
just about equal measure. I have found, in addition, much to consider in the, 
for me, less familiar research and conceptual arenas (Olney's Peircean analysis 
of dog communication, the sundering of representational perspectives on 
pointing by Young, Kaufman, & Nanay, and the "ocularist," 
neuroscientifically based analysis by Cappuccio, Chu, and Kita that emphasises 
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pointing as a co-variate of visual perception). The final papers in this special 
issue are concerned with a variety of processual or systematic concerns, 
including Meier and Lillo-Martin's conclusion that pointing's relation to 
symbolic language is reciprocally complex, Sparaci's intriguing analysis of 
atypical developmental trajectories in imperative and declarative 
communication of children with autism, Ulloa and George's review of the 
manifold social, neurological, and theoretical stances from which the 
comprehension of pointing and gaze can be analysed, and Baccarini's 
deconstruction and reconstitution of the visual dual-pathway model as applied 
to pointing. The issue finishes with Dow's aforementioned review of the 
aforementioned collection of papers on joint attention (Seemann, 2012), 
which constitutes a Janus-like looking back and looking forward to an 
embodied perspective on pointing in which--like Johnson's mighty stamp 
upon the rock in refutation of Berkeley's immaterialism--he decries the 
disembodiment of the inextricably embodied pointing gesture. 
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